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Abstract

Microfinance is an emerging important financial sub-sector in Asian transition countries. Its role is to improve financial access of the poor and small economic players and thus help them to build assets, thereby contribute to poverty alleviation. This paper provides an overview of rural finance and microfinance development in transition countries in Southeast and East Asia—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Mongolia—, focusing on the institutional evolution and the inter-relation between policies and institutions. We find diverse potentials that formal and semi-formal financial institution—agricultural banks, microfinance banks, microfinance NGOs, financial cooperatives and other indigenous financial systems—have to reach out to the rural poor of respective nations. Any monolithic view that expects a single type of microfinance institutions to dominate the rural financial markets is to be denied. To develop effective rural financial systems, some policy implications are drawn, such as reforms of agricultural banks, adoption of market-based policy framework, development of retail capacities of microfinance institutions, progressive establishment of legal and regulatory framework for microfinance, improvement in governance of indigenous financial systems, and the importance of savings mobilization.

Keywords: microfinance; transition economies; market-based policy and regulatory framework; governance; indigenous financial systems; institutional evolution

I. Introduction

Socio-economic diversity among transition countries in Southeast and East Asia is large. The institutional heritage from previous centrally-planned economic systems is more uneven compared with that of former Soviet Union transition countries in Europe and Central Asia. The “gradual approach” for economic reforms in Southeast or East Asia has often been cited as a salient characteristic, in contrast with the “shock approach” adopted by many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This gradualism, however, is to be understood as a consequence of diverse political and economic systems both before and after changes in the national regimes. A country-specific context largely dominates economic reform programs and processes. Thus, financial sector development is not an exception to the gradual process of domestic reform efforts in those countries.


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Microfinance is an emerging important financial sub-sector in Asian transition economies, as it is in many other regions. Its role is to improve financial access of the poor and small economic players and thus help them to build assets, which means a contribution to poverty alleviation. Since rural economy dominates Asian transition countries, microfinance is expected to play a significant role in improving rural financial systems, which are largely deficient in meeting demand for capital in the countryside.

Considering that the shape of existing financial systems and the degree of institutional development quite differ from country to country, questions arise: Can we expect any particular type of microfinance institutions to grow and dominate across different countries? What are the developmental issues and transition issues of microfinance? What policies and institutional reforms are appropriate for microfinance development in transition countries? To answer these questions, one should firstly look closely at how different institutions are evolving to reach out to the rural poor in Asian transition countries in the period of microfinance.

With the above-mentioned viewing angle, this paper attempts to provide an overview of rural finance and development of microfinance in transition countries in Southeast and East Asia, excluding China—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Mongolia. It focuses on the institutional evolution and the inter-relation between policies and institutions, through exploitation of secondary information in literature and, in some cases, firsthand information. Section II outlines the rural finance and microfinance development in rural areas in each nation. Section III highlights the institutional evolution of agricultural banks. Section IV highlights the evolution by major institution types of microfinance. Section V draws policy implications from the previous sections, though tentative. A chief limitation of this paper is that the arguments remain in sketch form and each country experience is treated very briefly, due to space constraints. However, we hope that the paper would be able to provide a holistic view on the impact of various environments and policies on the development of rural finance and microfinance development in the countries concerned.

II. Overview of Rural Finance and Microfinance Development in Transition Countries in Southeast and East Asia

Cambodia

Cambodia has a population of 12.3 million, of which about 10 million live in rural areas. The financial sector is still in its infancy. Banks have to this point played only a small role in savings mobilization and financial intermediation and their operations are generally confined to Phnom Penh. Nearly 40 percent of the people have no access to formal bank branches and only 6 percent of total banking sector advances are for agriculture or related activities. Cambodia does not have any specialized public bank, or other financial vehicle, that extends retail services to farmers. Such an institutional vacuum in formal financial supply seems to characterize the basic environment of Cambodian rural finance, there is high anticipation for microfinance development to fill the huge gap in demand and supply of rural financial services. NGOs who became active in the late 1970s with the humanitarian

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3 This note basically deals with microfinance as a concept of the financial business model without differentiating between those in rural and those in urban areas; however, descriptions on microfinance institutions are mostly addressed to those operating in rural areas.

4 China is excluded for two reasons: (i) the knowledge and experiences of the authors in analyzing China’s microfinance is insufficient, and (ii) the primary purpose of this paper as presented to OECD conference on China rural finance is to draw policy implications from experiences in transition economies other than China.

5 Sources: see section of Cambodia in bibliography.
approach have gradually moved out of relief and rehabilitation works and redefined their roles in interventions in the development process. Among those interventions, microcredit undertakings have thrived since the early 1990s, and most of the country’s 24 provinces now have microcredit services provided by NGOs (reportedly numbering 72 in total).

Cognizant of serious lack in rural financial services, the government has adopted a series of policy measures, supported by international donors: (i) establishment of the Credit Committee for Rural Development (CCRD) in 1995; (ii) introduction of a framework in the Banking Law to enable eligible NGOs and other rural finance providers to become regulated microfinance institutions; (iii) creation of a unit in the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) to supervise and monitor MFIs; and (iv) establishment of an apex institution to provide financing for MFIs, namely the Rural Development Bank (RDB). With these measures being in effect since the late 1990s, it can be said that among Southeast and East Asian transition countries, Cambodia has put in place the most supportive fundamentals as to policy framework for microcredit development (but not necessarily in terms of savings mobilization), though local capacities and institutions are to be yet substantially developed. Currently, specialized banks engaged in microfinance and NGO MFIs are integrated into the regulations of the NBC. With technical and financial supports by donors, the NBC developed banking legislation that includes registration and licensing requirements and some prudential standards for larger MFIs. As of the end of 2001, there were 32 registered NGOs and MFIs, the top five of which dominated more than 80 percent of the aggregated loan portfolio, including ACLEDA Bank (specialized bank), the EMT and Hatthakaksekar (licensed NGOs), and PRASAC and Seilanithih (registered NGOs). In total the rural financial institutions reach around 420,000 borrowers, which represent about 23 percent of the rural households. Among them, the rapid growth of ACLEDA Bank is phenomenal: after only about three years in operation as an NGO microfinance project, ACLEDA transformed into a microfinance specialized bank in 1995, and it as of the end of 2002 had 75 branches in 14 provinces and a workforce of 863. Its loan outstanding had grown to US$27 million, serving more than 80,000 borrowing customers.6 Fully supported by international donors since its establishment, ACLEDA Bank has been expanding its range of products in retail banking to include loans to small and medium enterprises, cash management and money transfer services, and deposit services to the public. Savings mobilized by ACLEDA’s deposits are yet small (US$5.7 million in 19,070 accounts as of the end of 2002), but have been growing rapidly in recent years.

As regards the RDB, a governmental wholesale conduit to MFIs, the loan outstanding (to five financial institutions) was US$1.9 million as of January 2002, with an additional US$20 million available in credit from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to be on-lent to MFIs.

Lao PDR7

Lao PDR remains largely agricultural and rural. About 85 percent of the workforce is engaged in agriculture, which generates 51 percent of the GDP. The financial sector in Lao PDR is small relative to the size of the national economy (the total banking system assets are approximately 25 percent of GDP) and, in particular, has achieved a very low level of outreach in rural areas. According to the UNDP/UNCDF estimation based on a rural household survey conducted in 1996, only 11 percent of rural people had the ability to access formal financial institutions, and only 1 percent saved in bank deposits. Foreign banks are not allowed to open branches outside the municipality of Vientiane.

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The country’s current policy to support rural access to finance has been implemented

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6 The amount of loan outstanding was at the end of 2002, according to ACELEDA annual report 2002. The number of borrowing customers was reported as 81,453 as of the end of 2002, according to In Channy (2002).

7 Sources: see section of Lao PDR in bibliography.
primarily by the Agriculture Promotion Bank (APB), functioning as a policy bank (one of the four state-owned banks established in 1993). The APB is, to date, the only formal credit provider of any significance in rural Lao PDR. Although its financial situation is unclear, the APB has been producing operating losses and has accumulated a high level of problem loans, resulting in periodic recapitalization by the government, according to the ADB. The APB’s operations have been reportedly controlled by the government, including the setting of the level of interest rates, and thus responsibility and management autonomy as a financial institution have been limited. However, given the difficult operating environment for rural finance, the government has moved to introduce microfinance projects since the late 1990s. Pilot microfinance projects catering to the rural poor have recently emerged with supports by donors and international NGOs; reportedly, the current outreach by the three largest MFIs, including the Lao Women’s Union (LWU), has been estimated at about 10,000 clients. Currently, there are no regulations for NGO MFIs in Lao PDR.

There are also traditional credit schemes and revolving funds based at the village level, generally called “village revolving funds” (VRFs), in Lao PDR, which serve as financial and social intermediaries between supporters (the government and donors) and villagers. It is reported that more than 1,600 VRFs serving about 8,000 borrowers are active; however, they are not operating on a financially sustainable basis. Recently, the government established the Rural Micro Finance Committee (RMFC) and prepared to assess the status of rural microfinance so that it could develop a policy statement and action plans for implementing sustainable microfinance. The World Bank reports that the draft is currently under a consultative process including stakeholders such as donors, practitioners, and provincial authorities.

Myanmar

Myanmar is an agriculture-based country in which more than 70 percent of the population resides in rural areas (total population: 48.3 million) and the agricultural sector (including livestock, fisheries, and forestry) accounts for 57 percent of GDP. In rural Myanmar, the Myanma Agricultural Development Bank (MADB), a state-owned bank established in 1953, is virtually the only major source of institutional credit, with the exception of financial cooperative societies; the Myanmar Economic Bank (state-owned) and private commercial banks are mostly confined to the urban areas. The MADB’s mandate and funding priority have been for the benefit of farmers, but the scale of loans is severely limited, mainly due to funding constraints. Also, the mountainous geography and poor infrastructure in the rural area make provision of financial services very difficult. As a result, there is huge excess demand for capital in the countryside.

Microfinance in Myanmar is an exogenous phenomenon brought to the country in 1997 by international NGOs (PACT, GRET, and Grameen Trust) contracted with the UNDP/UNOPS, who are interested in using microfinance as part of an overall package for poverty alleviation in the three specially designated regions in the rural area. Although such microfinance projects are yet at the early stage, the aggregate number of clients has grown quite rapidly; the estimated number of active borrowers exceeded 100,000 after only about four years’ operation. However, the geographical coverage by those projects is yet very small (only a few percent of the country’s townships), which may be explained by the experimental or pilot nature of the UNDP/UNOPS project.

Thus, microfinance in Myanmar is yet at an embryonic stage; it is only of project status, supported by international donors, although the quick growth in outreach provides

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8 APB has never published its financial statements (ADB, 2002).
9 Sources: see section of Myanmar in bibliography. The observations and estimations deriving from the authors’ field research on microfinance in Myanmar in 2001-2002 are also included.
encouraging evidence of potentials for future growth. The Myanmar government, including the central bank,\textsuperscript{10} has insufficient exposure to microfinance practices, though at least two sensitization seminars supported by donors have been held since 1999.\textsuperscript{11} The country lacks the policy framework, legal structure for registering microfinance NGOs, and administrative structure that are needed for dealing with microfinance undertakings. As for indigenous financial systems in Myanmar, savings and credit cooperative societies are run under the auspice of the Ministry of Cooperatives and small-scale economic players are a large part of their members. The number of such savings and credit societies in operation is said to be about 2,000 throughout the nation, which indicates that the cooperatives form a sector of some significant weight in rural financial activities in Myanmar.

**Vietnam\textsuperscript{12}**

In Vietnam, 75 percent of the population and 90 percent of the poor currently live in rural areas. Agricultural activities account for 70 percent of the income of rural dwellers. Hence, in spite of vigorous industrial growth and economic structural transformation throughout the 1990s, the rural economy is yet dominant in Vietnam. Since its establishment in 1988, the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD)\textsuperscript{13} has been the major source of credit and savings in rural Vietnam. Its growth in size and scope during the 1990s is remarkable: VBARD is regarded as having contributed significantly to the agricultural expansion under the *doi-moi* (renovation) policies in Vietnam. Now the biggest commercial bank, it has a very extensive network (1,568 branches) and serves 5.5 million rural households, which represent as large as 45 percent of the total. It had total outstanding loans of US$4 billion and deposits of US$1.8 billion as of 2001. The Vietnamese government established the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) in 1995 to serve poor households that could not be reached by VBARD, whose major task was to provide subsidized credit through a joint liability group. The VBP used VBARD’s extensive network of branches; it had no separate staff members and was not involved in any savings activity. By 2002, the VBP had provided a total of US$ 452 million in credit to some 2.7 million households, which is a substantial outreach. However, the most crucial issue concerning the VBP was its lack of long-term viability and sustainability. In 2002, one of the financial reforms to separate policy lending from commercial banking included the reorganization of the VBP as a new policy bank. Thus the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) was established in March 2003, integrating all of the operations of the VBP and four other policy lending programs that were extended by the government, including loans to students and “employment generation” programs, i.e., lending to small entrepreneurs.

At the commune level, there used to be thousands of credit cooperatives (about 7,100 in 1985) throughout the country. They, however, collapsed by 1990 and the substantial amount of deposits (reportedly VND100 billion) were not reimbursed to their owners. In 1993, People’s Credit Funds (PCFs) were established, commune-level savings and credit cooperatives modeled on the *Caisse Populaire* Credit Union System in Quebec, Canada; they now form another pillar of rural finance in Vietnam, operating under the cooperative law. As of the end of 2001, there were 906 PCFs totaling 807,546 member, loans outstanding of US$168 million, and mobilized savings of US$128 million. PCFs can be regarded as microfinance institutions that, while operating without any subsidies, have been relatively successful in reaching out to the poor and mobilizing savings.

\textsuperscript{10} The Central Bank of Myanmar is not autonomous from the government; it is part of the Ministry of Finance and Revenue.
\textsuperscript{11} Microfinance seminars were organized by UNDP/UNOPS in November 1999 and by JICA in June 2002.
\textsuperscript{12} Sources: see section of Vietnam in bibliography.
\textsuperscript{13} VBARD was established in 1988 as the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture, separated from the State Bank. In 1996 its mandate was extended to include development of the rural economy, rather than only agriculture, and thus its name was changed.
VBARD, the VBSP, and the PCFs are thus forming a formal sector for the provision of microfinance and are supervised by the State Bank of Vietnam. In addition to their activities, the various roles of semi-formal actors should be noted, in particular those of people’s organizations such as Vietnamese Women Union and international NGO projects, in rural finance. People’s or mass organizations, though not financial intermediaries per se, are quasi-governmental bodies that are represented at all levels, from national to commune. They often act as “brokers” between VBARD or the VBSP and their borrowers and establish savings and credit groups that enable them to reach many rural poor (1.6 million as of 1998). However, they heavily depend on the government for loan funds. International NGOs are active in Vietnam in bringing in best practices, providing capacity building programs, and implementing savings and credit schemes. Nonetheless, they are yet small compared with those of other Asian countries in terms of size relative to the nation’s financial system. Finally, the postal savings have grown rapidly since the programs establishment in 1999; as of the end of 2002, the total outstanding was over US$250 million among 420,000 accounts, collected by 709 offices throughout the country.14

**Mongolia**

Mongolia is a vast country with one of the lowest population densities in the world. The inhabitants number only 2.4 million and are widely dispersed over the land, the surface of which is equivalent to that of Alaska. About 65 percent of the population reside in rural areas and a large part of them live as semi-nomadic herders. Agriculture contributes about 30 percent of GDP. The lack of access to financial services in rural Mongolia has been perceived as one of the key constraints to the country’s rural development. Until recently, there were only two formal financial institutions that had networks at the *soum* (village) level: the Agricultural Bank of Mongolia (AgBank) and Post Bank. Financial services diffusion was further hampered by a series of banking crises during the 1990s that caused the whole banking system to suffer from widespread public distrust. As a result, rural finance in Mongolia became a serious need that was very difficult to fulfill. AgBank was founded in 1991, inheriting the rural banking network of the State Bank. AgBank became insolvent after years of accumulated losses, and in 1999 the Bank of Mongolia placed it in receivership. Since then, many programs for remediation have been initiated, supported by international donors, as all of the stakeholders realized the importance of AgBank whose network in rural areas was the most extensive. The management was contracted with a foreign firm, and finally the privatization was successfully finalized in March 2003. The results of restructuring during this process have initially been viewed as successful; the rehabilitation of the rural financial infrastructure thus far includes the following increases in 2002: branch offices, from 269 to 356; employees, from 803 to 1,525; loans, to more than 400,000 in number; and deposits, to US$39 million. According to AgBank, one out of every two rural households uses AgBank. As for the client base, it is reported that AgBank is strengthening its focus on wealthier herders, rather than the poor segment.

Also dramatic in the recent evolution of Mongolian rural microfinance was the birth of XacBank16 in 2001, a product of the merger of the nation’s first finance company (XAC Co. Ltd.) that originated from the UNDP-supported MicroStart project and an SME lending institution in the Gobi region (Goviin Ehlel Ltd.) funded by USAID. Being owned by seven NGOs through the holding company, XacBank has 15 branches in rural areas in addition to its six in Ulaanbaaeter. As of the end of 2002 it had 11,063 borrowers with total loan outstanding of US$4.9 million (of which, “microloans” constituted 51 percent) and savings of US$6.0 million. So far XacBank has targeted the “vulnerable non-poor” and the “moderately poor.”

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15 Sources: see section of Mongolia in bibliography.
16 Xac is a Mongolian acronym for “Golden Fund for Development.”
Besides the fast growing AgBank and XacBank, savings and credit unions (SCUs) and NGO microfinance have also emerged in rural microfinance. Backed by active donor supports, the rural finance in Mongolia has been experiencing an ice-breaking moment in its history. The first SCUs outside the capital were formed in 1999 and, as of the end of 2001, 135 SCUs were registered, out of which 69 were located in rural areas. The ADB has been supporting these undertakings. As to NGO microfinance and donor-supported projects, UNDP reports that about 60 are active, among which is Credit Mongol, a non-bank financial institution functioning as an implementer of a UNDP-DFID applied research project, has been attracting an increased level of attention from the donor community. Other projects have also been implemented, including those under the auspices of the World Bank Sustainable Livelihoods Support Project and World Vision.

III. Agricultural Banks/Rural Development Banks

Institutional Forms

As was overviewed in section I, agricultural banks are currently playing a central role as formal providers of financial services in rural areas in Asian transition countries, and a good part of their operation is to serve small farmers, and in some cases non-farmers, in the countryside, even though microfinance methodology has not necessarily been built into the system. The most sizable outreach has been achieved by VBARD (Vietnam), which serves as much as 45 percent of the nation’s total households. The MADB (Myanmar) is the second largest agricultural bank in terms of workforce, serving about 1.6 million rural households. Although its recent operational and financial status is unknown, the APB (Lao PDR) remains the only formal supplier of credit of any significance in Lao PDR. These three banks basically follow a policy bank model of being fully owned by the government and thus are given the major mandate of supporting agricultural expansion and related activities in the countryside of their respective countries. However, their banking licenses differ depending on the country context. For example, VBARD is given the status of full-fledged commercial bank that serves to farming and non-farming individuals and enterprises, whereas the MADB is mandated by a special law to limit its scope mostly to seasonal crop loans to farmers. AgBank (Mongolia) is an example involving institutional transformation from the governmental policy bank model. After it was established as a state-owned commercial bank holding an extended outreach in rural areas, subsequent managerial failures caused insolvency, which necessitated that the authorities initiate comprehensive restructuring of the bank’s operations and financial base. The Mongolian government pursued the AgBank’s organizational rehabilitation and improvement of governance by adopting a management contract with a foreign party and, eventually, privatization involving foreign investors. While these four banks are financial service retailers in rural areas, the RDB (Cambodia) is a small apex organization for the purpose of channeling (on-lending) funds to financial intermediaries specialized in microcredit. This formation derived from, on one hand, a serious lack of any significant formal outreach by any existing financial institution and, on the other hand, the government’s determination to use microfinance systems to reach rural areas rather than expecting commercial banks’ networks to expand.

Targeted Borrowers and Credit Extension.

As regards recipients for banking services, VBARD (Vietnam) and AgBank (Mongolia) deal with both individuals and enterprises since they are committed to becoming effective rural commercial banks, whereas the APB (Lao PDR) and MADB (Myanmar) target mostly small farmers. The RDB (Cambodia) channels on-lent funds through microcredit intermediaries to farmers and microenterprises. Among these banks, VBARD’s and AgBank’s management directions, targeting clients, and their lending methodologies merit particular attention. The experience indicates that directed credit, when done in a non-flexible manner or
when it is forced, is not an effective means for rural finance. Traditional types of directed credit extended by retail agricultural banks include either short-term loans to farmers and herders or other agricultural extension, as well as some specific mid- or long-term loans to capital investment for the agricultural sector. It is well documented that inflexible directed credit to specific production activities that is accompanied by provision of very low interest rates to end users, has experienced many failures in terms of operational and financial performance across the world: VBARD’s and AgBank’s ongoing experiences, however, may fall into different models. Although VBARD still involves directed credit and its lending has been at interest rates too low to cover its financial costs, it has not been providing “cheap credit.” 17 AgBank has been more freely charging interest rates that will enable them to recover their costs.

Savings Mobilization

To date, mobilization of savings by agricultural banks is more successful than that by any other financial organizations involving microfinance undertakings, in relative terms, in Asian transition countries. However, more traditional types of agricultural banks are less successful among the five countries referred to in this paper. The APB (Lao PDR) has been dependent on borrowing from the government or the central bank for its financial resources. The MADB (Myanmar), in which the major finance is provided by short-term borrowing from the central bank, mobilizes yet a limited amount of savings from farmers, though its outreach in terms of the number of savings accounts is fairly sizable. In contrast, VBARD (Vietnam) has mobilized savings of US$1.8 billion, at a rapid growth rate. In the case of AgBank (Mongolia), the deposits collected from herders were already the major financial resources for banking operations even prior to the organizational restructuring; after implementing the rehabilitation programs, the savings amount from herders and agricultural businesses has been growing rapidly, and now constitutes 76 percent of the total liabilities in addition to equity capital of the bank. The relative success in mobilization of savings in rural commercial banks in Vietnam and Mongolia can be attributed largely to the following factors: (i) stable macroeconomic management to keep positive real interest rates; (ii) extended branch networks throughout the respective countries; and (iii) more or less flexible financial products for clients in rural areas.

IV. Microfinance Banks/NGOs and Financial Cooperatives

Microfinance Banks

In the five transition countries covered in this paper, two privately owned microfinance banks are operating: ACLEDA Bank (Cambodia) and XacBank (Mongolia). Although they exist in the different country contexts, the following institutional and environmental similarities are recognized:

(i) Their origins are as an NGO or a private company with a strong stake in rural areas, which had a clear vision to cater to small economic players and the poor.

(ii) Their operations have been fully supported by international donors since their establishment, and the rapid transformation into regulated banks specialized in microfinance and small finance was achieved through the involvement of such strong support.

17 See World Bank (2002) and Izumida (2002). In Vietnam, the interest rate regulations on banking services have been gradually removed since the mid-1990s and currently there is no ceiling on rates for credit provision. However, VBARD is not seemingly very flexible in changing lending interest rates compared with other state-owned commercial banks; to what extent this practice has been imposed by the government policies remains to be clarified. As to directed credit, Izumida (2003) estimates that approximately 20 percent of lending is still directed by the state and reports that the policy for rescheduling payment schedules for existing clients is also influenced by the state.
The governments and monetary authorities in the two countries have been exposed to microfinance practices and are on the way to developing enabling legal and regulatory frameworks.

Because their respective monetary authorities have not limited them with ceilings on their interest rates, those microfinance banks are charging sufficient levels to be sustainable entities.

They are achieving rapid growth in loan portfolio through extension of their branch networks.

They aim at offering more full-fledged retail bank services, including provision of loans to small and medium enterprises and other financial services to the public as commercial banks.

Mobilization of savings is yet limited in relative terms to credit extension, though rapid growth has been seen recently.

The VBP (Vietnam), the VBSP’s predecessor, was unique as a governmental bank in that it provided unsecured small credit to the poor. As was stated in section I, its character was virtually more of a loan fund than of a bank since it did not have its own organizational structure or staff members and its operations were entirely dependent on the branch network of VBARD. The VBP was heavily subsidized by government funds and charged lower lending rates than those of VBARD; thus, the VBP lacked the financial base for sustainability. Moreover, non-separation of such policy lending from commercial banking evoked criticism from both society and the donor community as it severely undermines financial discipline in borrowers. The VBP's transformation into the VBSP is an attempt to segregate policy lending and establish the bank’s own organizational structure, including a branch network; however, the institutional and financial viability is uncertain at this moment.18

Microfinance NGOs and Projects

It is estimated that more than 230 projects involving microfinance, either in full scale or as a component of their other activities, are being carried out by local or international NGOs in the five transition countries. Considering that many of them started operations in the last decade or so, this emergence is an encouraging proof of the potential of microfinance development in this region. Microfinance seems to be offer a viable alternative to traditional moneylending to poor people and small scale players who have been shut out from the formal banking system. The most sizable outreach achieved by NGO microfinance, to date, is seen in Cambodia, where the total estimated number of borrowers of all rural MFIs has reached about a quarter of the rural households, according to NBC. Generally speaking, local capacities to run microfinance programs in a professional way are yet very weak in many aspects, such as implementation of adequate lending methodologies, achievement of sound financial management, and establishment of appropriate governance in spite of active support by international NGOs specialized in microfinance. Nonetheless, some good examples of institutionalization, based on reliable track records in outreach and financial sustainability, have emerged in the region.

According to Izumida (2003), the newly established VBSP is exempted from holding capital reserves and the clients’ deposits at VBSP will be fully guaranteed by the state. The lending interest rates to the poor (0.5% per month) are set below the 6-month term deposit rates at VBARD and the PCFs, indicating that subsidized credit would distort rural financial markets as was the case in the former VBP. Izumida also warns that the VBSP’s establishment of its own branch network, which would probably incur operational inefficiencies, would bring about huge social costs.
As to the impact of policy framework for NGO microfinance, the following are observed:

(i) Each country’s legislative framework in some way provides for the registration of NGOs involved in microfinance, but with quite diverse authorizing activities. Cambodia has established a set of standards to register microfinance NGOs under the regulations of the NBC, whereas the other four countries do not have such explicit regulatory frameworks. Among them, Myanmar’s is the least developed; microfinance undertakings are only allowed as part of humanitarian projects that require special agreement with line ministries on a project by project basis.

(ii) In Cambodia, as a result of its central bank’s regulatory framework, “licensed” NGO MFIs have emerged, in addition to a microfinance bank (ACLEDA). The MFIs are making progress in terms of information disclosure, which will significantly contribute to establishment of industry standards and risk management of the monetary authorities.

(iii) Formal and informal associations or forums among NGOs and projects that involve microfinance have thrived and are contributing to the establishment of a base for dialogue among practitioners and policy makers. Examples of formal committees on rural finance and microfinance are found in Cambodia and Lao PDR, and informal dialogue has widely emerged in the region, including at opportunities driven by donors as part of financial sector or rural finance projects.

Financial Cooperatives and Other Indigenous Systems

The experiences in these five Asian transition countries provide some indication of the potentials of financial cooperatives and other indigenous financial systems to become important sub-sectors of their domestic financial systems. Together with other microfinance undertakings, the mutual financial systems running at the small community level are contributing to enable poor and small economic players to switch from informal finance (borrowing from relatives or moneylenders in villages) to formal or semi-formal means. Also, given the “savings first” mechanism, one of the salient advantages of the financial cooperatives is their effectiveness in mobilizing savings, and, once appropriate governance is in place, the financial demand of their members can be expected to contribute towards healthy development.

An encouraging examples of cooperatives’ responsiveness to rural financial needs is indicated by PCFs in Vietnam that have been rapidly expanding at the commune level through the delivery of microcredit and the mobilization of savings in only for less than 10 years of operation. Another example of rapid growth in observed in savings and credit unions in Mongolia since 1999. The institutional forms and linkages of financial cooperatives with the formal sector vary and this bears future studies. In Myanmar, savings and credit societies are one form of many kinds of cooperatives, which are registered under the Ministry of Cooperatives.

V. Policy Implications

An overview of rural finance and microfinance development in Asian transition countries shows us the diverse potentials that formal and semi-formal financial institutions have to reach out to the rural poor and small economic players in the countryside. Any monolithic view that expects a single MFI type—either NGOs or specialized banks—to dominate the financial market for microcredit and microsavings is neither healthy nor realistic. Existing formal and semi-formal financial systems should be reformed to overcome the constraints deriving from their old models to deliver financial products, and emerging innovative NGOs have still many tasks ahead before being institutionalized and eventually integrated into the
formal financial sector. The following policy implications are drawn by the previous sections:

(i) **Reform of Agricultural Banks.** The extensive branch networks of agricultural banks are invaluable socio-economic infrastructure for rural finance; however, inefficient management, often in the form of inflexible directed credit, not only undermines such assets but also inhibits borrowers’ development of financial discipline. Effective reforms are being undertaken in the region: retail services can be developed by strengthening commercial banking with more varied financial products by market-based pricing (VBARD and AgBank). The core issue, to cover the social costs, is managerial autonomy from the political decision-making rather than the argument that state ownership is disruptive. Existing agricultural banks, regardless of the ownership structure, should challenge to reconcile their mandate of contributing to the rural economy with the achievement of financial sustainability.

(ii) **Financial Sector Vision and Market-Based Policy Framework for Rural and Microfinance.** This is a basic requirement for developing an efficient rural financial system, as it is far easier to start with a set of enabling policies rather than modifying policies after they become a practice or norm. The Cambodian experience clearly shows that the government’s and the monetary authorities’ understanding and support to market-based approaches to rural finance enable MFIs to grow fast. On the other hand, co-existence of the market-based microfinance undertakings and the provision of heavily subsidized microcredit by the governmental schemes is to be resolved (e.g. Vietnam).

(iii) **Development of Retail Capacities of MFIs.** The further development of rural finance and microfinance is constrained by the insufficient capacity of current institutions, e.g., local NGOs, to expand and become strong institutions. There is an obvious need to develop retail capacities of MFIs.

(iv) **Legal and Regulatory Environment for MFIs.** Over the world, most MFIs grow outside the regulatory system at the early stage of development and so are the Asian transition countries studied in this paper. This basically provides favorable conditions for MFIs to adopt non-conventional methodologies to deliver financial services to the poor. However, if severe restrictions for microfinance operations exist or if the existing legal framework discourages NGOs to start microfinance undertakings, those restrictions should be urgently removed. In a country like Myanmar, the registration system for NGOs to lawfully deliver microcredit is to be established. Another indication from this overview is that there is a clear need to develop or improve regulatory capacities in the monetary authorities to understand particular risk profiles of microfinance. Capacity building of regulators should, generally speaking, prevail to drafting particular laws and regulations for microfinance.

(v) **Improvement in Governance of Indigenous Financial Systems.** Each country has developed indigenous financial systems that have some potential for being mainstreamed to or linked with the formal financial system in the future. The foremost challenge of indigenous groups for sound expansion is an achievement of good governance. There is need to study those systems to draw lessons and identify tasks and action plans, under specific context of each country, to be mainstreamed or linked with the formal system.

(vi) **Savings Mobilization and Financial Sustainability.** Savings mobilization cannot be overemphasized, since it benefits both the MFIs and the small depositor clientele and thus contributes to financial deepening in the rural economy. There is a need to ensure that the savings of poor people entrusted to MFIs are safe and sound.
### Table: Rural Finance and Microfinance Development in Transition Countries in Southeast and East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Profile</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Profile</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (rural portion)</td>
<td>12.3 million (85%)</td>
<td>5.3 million (76%)</td>
<td>48.3 million (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (000/sq. km)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (US$)</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic investment/GDP</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic savings/GDP</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2/GDP</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>25.7 (1999)</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Banking Reforms

- **Two-tiered banking system**
  - Cambodia: National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) separated commercial banks in 1991
  - Lao PDR: The Bank of Lao PRD (BOL) established in 1990
  - Myanmar: Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) established in 1990
  - Mongolia: Bank of Mongolia (BOM)

- **Interest rate regulation (explicit)**
  - No: Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, Mongolia

- **State-owned banks**
  - Cambodia: 2 (FTB, RDB)
  - Lao PDR: 4 (BCEL Bank, Lao Mai Bank, Lane Xang Bank, APB)
  - Myanmar: 4 (MEB, MFTB, MCIB, MDB)
  - Vietnam: 6 (BIDV, VCB, ICB, VBARD, VBSP, MDHDB)
  - Mongolia: 1 (Savings Bank)

- **Total assets of the banking system**

- **Private banks (excluding rep. offices of foreign banks)**
  - Cambodia: 12 local banks; 5 foreign branch banks; 2 specialized banks
  - Lao PDR: 10 private banks
  - Myanmar: 20 private banks
  - Vietnam: 39 joint stock banks; 4 joint venture banks; 26 foreign bank branches
  - Mongolia: 11 private banks

- **Banking crises**
  - Cambodia: -
  - Lao PDR: -
  - Myanmar: 2003 bank run at leading private commercial banks
  - Vietnam: -

- **Financial sector vision statement**
  - Cambodia: Financial Sector Blueprint for 2001-2010 (ADB)
  - Lao PDR: -
  - Myanmar: Rural Microfinance Committee (RMFC)

- **Rural credit policy**
  - Cambodia: Credit Committee for Rural Development (CCRD) in 1995
  - Lao PDR: -

- **Agricultural Banks or Rural Development Banks**
  - Cambodia: Rural Development Bank (RDB) established in 1998
  - Lao PDR: The Agricultural Promotion Bank (APB) established in 1993
  - Myanmar: Myanma Agricultural Development Bank established in 1993
  - Vietnam: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) established in 1988
  - Mongolia: AgBank established in 1991 (privatized in March 2003)

- **Network**
  - Cambodia: 17 provincial branches and 50 sub-service units
  - Lao PDR: 15 regional offices and 204 branches (2000)
  - Myanmar: 1,568 branches (2001)

- **Employees**
  - Cambodia: n/a
  - Lao PDR: n/a
  - Myanmar: 3,357 (2000)
  - Mongolia: 1,525 (2002)

- **Outreach**
  - Cambodia: wholesale organization
  - Lao PDR: (APB reports it served 15% of all villages, containing 14% of all 1.6 million borrowers; 2.0 million savings accounts (2000)
  - Myanmar: Serving 5.5 million households; the total loan outstanding of US$4 (the number of loans made in 2000-2002 was 400,000; AgBank reports
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lao PDR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households in 1996 and had 12,000 depositors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Donors</strong></td>
<td>AFD, ADB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assets (composition, %)</strong></td>
<td>-Loans 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Deposits with NBC 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Others 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liabilities/Equity</strong></td>
<td>-Deposits (customers) 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(composition, %)</td>
<td>-Capital/reserves 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-“Borrowing a/c” 52</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Microfinance Institutions</strong></td>
<td>ACLEDA Bank: more than 80,000 borrowers; loan outstanding $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated Number of NGOs &amp; Projects involving microfinance</strong></td>
<td>72 local and international NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading NGOs / Projects</strong></td>
<td>Hatthakaksekar, EMT, Seilanithih, UNICEF, MOWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outreach of MFIs</strong></td>
<td>4,000 (1991) -- 420,000 borrowers (235% of rural households (12/2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Cooperatives and Other Indigenous Financial Systems</strong> (incl. urban area)</td>
<td>Only one official (CCSP); network not yet emerged, Approx. 1,600 village revolving funds (VRFs): credit $5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note</strong></td>
<td>Postal savings: total outstanding $250 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Lao PDR:

Mongolia:


**Myanmar:**

**Vietnam:**
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